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DEMOCRATIZATION, ETHNICITY, AND

WAR

LINDSAY BAXTER

The democrtltic peace theory has receil'ed considerable attention in the international relations
literature during recent yelm. Critics haw tempered the initial enthusiasm for the democratic
petlce theory b)' demollStratillg thm the road to democracy is often a rock)' and treacherou.' one.
This rcse,zrch .'eeks to reproduce the work ol two prominent authors in the democratization
literature and then expand upon their research. Here, I investigate how the ethnic composition ola democrtltizing mae afficts that state's likelihood of being inllOlzled in an internal war
rather than an externalll'ar during the proces.' ofdemocratization. The statistical results indielite that ethnicit)' does indeed illf/uence a democratizing state's tendemy to become embroiled
in cit'il conflict rather than extenz,zl conflict. A discuHion of two case studies at the
conclusion of the paperfurther illustrtltes my statistical conclusions.

T

he democratic peace theory stands at the center of an important debate
in international relations. How does a state's regime type influence
whether that state will go to war with other nations? Given fairly narrow
definitions of war and democracy, the democratic peace theory maintains that
democracies do not fight among themselves (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 5).
Although democracies are not necessarily less likely to go to war with nondemocrac!es, historical evidence seems to indicate that war between democratic
nations is rare if not nonexistent. As a result of this phenomenon,
politicians and scholars alike often maintain that the spread of democracy should be a high national security priority in order to hasten the
end of violent interstate conflict.
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Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder seek to temper this enthusiasm with a
reminder that "countries do not become mature democracies overnight" (1995,
5). The transition to democratic government can be lengthy and is often a
rocky process fraught with political upheavals and violent clashes. Indeed,
during the "transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states" (5).
Mansfield and Snyder maintain that democratizing states are more bellicose
than mature democracies for several reasons. First, during the process of democratization, a greater number of groups participate in the political pr.ocess and
compete for political power (2002, 299). Second, competing groups vie for the
support of the masses by appealing to nationalist sentiments without fully submitting to democratic accountability. Elites often justify excluding their
opponents from democratic processes by labeling rivals as national enemies
(289, 301). Third, in democratizing nations, public "pressures for [political]
participation are strong but institutions for effective participation are weak"
(1995, 23). Institutions that foster peaceful and effective political participation
in mature democracies are only partially developed in the early stages of democratization and therefore cannot "effectively regulate ... mass political competition" (2002, 299). Fourth, old elites, who stand to lose the most from a
transition to democracy, typically have strong connections to the military
(1995,26). Fifth, aspiring political leaders often employ nationalist appeals that
exaggerate accounts of foreign threats in order to solidify domestic support. As
a result, hard-pressed regimes may seek to increase domestic support by launching military campaigns abroad (2002, 299; 1995, 33). Finally, rival elites may
cooperate and form incoherent ruling coalitions that are both unable to send
clear signals of commitment to other states and that are particularly prone to
internal political logrolling (2002, 302, 304; 1995, 32).
These conditions indicate that a period of democratization will likely be a
particularly volatile time in a state's political history. Mansfield and Snyder
employ statistical analyses to demonstrate that, as a result of these factors,
democratizing nations are especially vulnerable to external conflict.
Two points of Mansfield and Snyder's argument offer a clear explanation
of why democratization causes external wars. First, elites who launch military
ventures abroad in hopes of improving their standing at home provoke external
enemies and plunge democratizing states into war. Second, when rival elites
accommodate each other through political logrolling strategies, they create
coalitions that pursue incompatible interests and inconsistent foreign policies.
Clashes with other states occur when these coalitions become "overcommitted,
provoking too many enemies at the same time" (1995, 32).
Other aspects of their argument, particularly that democratization
increases the number of groups competing for political power and that the
mechanisms of political participation in democratizing states are weak, seem to
indicate that democratization could also lead to intrastate conflict. Moreover,
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historical experience demonstrates that civil war often stains states' transitions
to democracy.
Although Mansfield and Snyder control for the effects of civil wars in their
statistical analysis (2002), they fail to investigate the connection between
democratization and internal warfare that is implied in their theoretical
argument. This omission sets the stage for an interesting question: Under
what conditions would a democratizing nation engage in civil warfare rather
than external warfare?
In this project, I seek to replicate and expand upon Mansfield and Snyder's
research effort. In addition to investigating the relationship between democratization and interstate conflict, I also seek to understand what factors precipitate democratizing states' entry into civil wars. I examine the relationship
between the ethnic composition of a state's population and the likelihood that
that state will engage in civil war rather than external war during a period of
democratization.
My statistical results demonstrate that the interaction between ethnic
heterogeneity and democratizing regime changes is an important factor in the
outbreak of civil war. Indeed, when ethnicity is included in the analysis, this
interaction is a more significant predictor of civil war in democratizing nations
than regime change alone. Mansfield and Snyder present strong statistical support
for their explanation of why external war accompanies states' transitions to
democracy. However, their model fails to provide such a robust explanation of
civil war. My analysis incorporates ethnicity into Mansfield and Snyder's
research design in a way that both enhances its predictive power and extends its
explanatory reach. The results that follow, therefore, offer an interesting addition to Mansfield and Snyder's research effort.
Two case studies at the conclusion of this paper offer a detailed description
of the theoretical reasoning that undergirds my argument. They present a
nuanced illustration of the [lctors that cause rival groups to mobilize. Tracing
the historical processes involved in each case supplies a vivid account of how
ethnic composition can influence a democratizing nation's entrance into civil or
external war.
Theoretical Framework, Research Expectations, and Definitions
Several scholars concur with Mansfield and Snyder's assessment of the
inherent dangers that attend the process of democratization. For example,
Michael Ward and Kristian Gleditsch note that "a smooth transition from low
to high levels of democratic governance is the exception, not the rule," because
democratic norms and institutions typically require time to become established
enough to inhibit conflict (1998, 53). Errol Henderson also acknowledges the
risks associated with democratization. He notes that "since 1945 most wars
have taken place within rather than between states," and that most of these civil
wars have occurred in postcolonial areas of the world. Henderson maintains
that the former colonies of the imperial powers are especially susceptible to civil
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war due to their "institutional underdevelopment ... as well as the failure of
postindependence political leadership to effectively integrate their societies into
cohesive national entities" (2002, 103). Weak political institutions in these
democratizing countries do not provide effective mechanisms for the nonviolent
resolution of domestic conflicts, nor do they ensure that popular constraints will
make political leaders responsive to dissidents' demands. As a result, such
countries are ill-prepared to prevent domestic insurgencies (l05-6).
It appears that Mansfield and Snyder anticipated this theoretical link
between states' transitions to democracy and internal conflict. Although they
contend that institutional weaknesses, intense political competition, and power
fragmentation and decentralization make democratizing states likely to engage
in war with other states, their argument also offers an implicit explanation of
why democratization might cause a state to engage in civil war. Mansfield and
Snyder make a persuasive case that competing elites exploit the political environment in democratizing states, an environment that indeed might make a
state prone to civil war, in ways that ultimately turn a country towards war with
other nations. However, it is clear from the theoretical argument that the
unique characteristics of democratizing politics could push a state toward civil
war just as they might push it toward international war.
Several schools of thought seek to explain why states become embroiled in
internal conflicts. One promising approach highlights the importance of ethnic
divisions within a state's population. The extensiveness of the scholarship on
ethnic conflict suggests that ethnicity often plays a significant role in violent
clashes both within and between states. I will discuss the principal theoretical
arguments in the ethnic conflict literature in conjunction with my case studies
in a subsequent section. Here, I merely offer a brief justification for incorporating a state's ethnic composition into my analysis of when and why democratizing nations become embroiled in civil war.
I expect that democratizing states will fight internally rather than
externally when significant lines of tension already exist in the national
population. Internal ethnic divisions promise to be the greatest cause of civil
conflict during democratization because ethnic cleavages aggravate the political
difficulties that states face on the road to democracy. Ethnicity is an intrinsic
part of individual identity, and as a result, group rivalries based on ethnic
differences present a fundamental threat to state loyalties. In democratizing
nations, competing elites resort to ethno-nationalist appeals to amass popular
support and mobilize the public in politically advantageous ways. Mansfield
and Snyder briefly note in their article that during democratization, divisive
nationalism is particularly problematic in ethnically stratified states because it
exacerbates the weakness and decentralization of democratizing political institutions (2002, 30 O. Ethnic rivalries often spill into violent conflict because
immature democratic institutions are too weak to permit opposing groups to
resolve their differences peacefully.
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Thus, I expect the institutional and political weakness of democratizing
regimes to be a necessary condition for internal violent conflict, and I expect
ethnic cleavages to be a sufficient condition to ignite such conflict. Ethnic divisions alone do not necessarily predispose a nation to internal strife. Rather, in
combination, the difficulties of democratization and ethnic fault lines put a
state at significant risk for civil war.
On the other hand, I expect ethnically homogenous states to be drawn into
external conflict much as Mansfield and Snyder postulate. Competing groups
will mobilize the masses by appealing to nationalist sentiments, and political
logrolling, compromise, and military expeditions abroad will propel these
nations into war with other countries. Because the internal divisions in
ethnically homogenous countries do not challenge basic state loyalties in the
fundamental way that ethnic rivalries do, the frictions particular to democratization are not likely to cause violent ruptures along internal lines in ethnically
uniform states.
Two main hypotheses follow from the foregoing argument:
Hypothesis 1: If a democratizing state has an ethnically heterogeneous population, then that state will be more prone to internal conflict than external
conflict during a period of democratization.
Hypothesis 2: If a democratizing state has an ethnically homogenous population, then that state will be more prone to external conflict than internal
conflict during a period of democratization.
I rely on Mansfield and Snyder's dataset from their article "Democratic
Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War" to determine regime type and
regime transitions in a given year; they in turn draw their data from Jagger and
Gurr's Polity III dataset,l a source widely used in the democratization literature.
Taylor and Hudson provide my measure of ethnic fractionalization in their
\Vor/d Htmdbook of Political and Social Indicators II.' They report ethnic fractionalization as an index measure calculated from ethnic and linguistic characteristics of 136 countries from approximately 1960 to 1965. This dataset lists
only one value of ethnic fractionalization for each country. Consequently, it is
clear that there are significant limitations to this measure of states' ethnic

'In this project I employ the dataset that MansfIeld and Snyder generated for their article
"Democratic Transiliolls, Institutional Strength, and \X'ar" that appeared in International
Orgtlniz.Jlfion in

spring 2002.

. Their dataset includes an index of ethnic fractionalization (Ethji-ac) that accounts for cultural,
ethnic. and linguistic differences between ethnic groups in 136 countries according to the
following formula:
F

=

I-I (n/N)(ni-I/N-I)

Where ni
N

=

=

tllllllber of people in the i'h group and

Total population'
SIGMA
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diversity. Although I do not expect a nation's ethnic composition to vary excessivelyover time, it is reasonable to anticipate some changes due to population
shifts, war, acculturation, etc. In addition, it appears that Taylor and Hudson
make little distinction between countries that have a few large ethnic groups
and those that have a plethora of small ethnic groups.' Despite these weaknesses, this appears to be the best measure available, and it ultimately yields
some interesting statistical results.
Research Design and Statistical Tests

In this project, I seek to replicate and expand upon Mansfield and Snyder's
research effort. In addition to investigating the relationship between democratization and interstate conflict, I also seek to determine whether ethnicity
affects democratizing states' entry into civil war rather than external war. Therefore, my design differs from Mansfield and Snyder in a few important ways.
I begin by employing Mansfield and Snyder's dataset from their recent
research effort and then add seven new variables to this dataset to include
ethnic fractionalization in the statistical analysis. The first variable, ethnic fractionalization, or ethfrac, is an index measure reporting one value for each of the
136 countries included in the World Handbook ofPolitical and Social Indicators.
The next five variables represent interactions between ethnic fractionalization
and each of Mansfield and Snyder's regime change variables.' Finally, I include
a variable for all civil wars in year t (in contrast to Mansfield and Snyder's civil
war control variable that reports all civil wars in year t-1).'
Because civil war and external war are both dichotomous, I use binary
logistic regression to assess the relationships between my variables. I calculate
this regression analysis several different ways. First, I replicate Mansfield and
Snyder's regression using the composite index of regime type that they generated
in their dataset." Next, I insert civil war as the dependent variable in Mansfield
and Snyder's moder to assess the model's usefulness in explaining internal

) For example, Taylor and Hudson report an ethnic fractionalization value 01'0.88 for South Africa
where, according to the CIA Worfdfoctbook. 75.2 percent of the population is black. 13.6 percent
is white, 8.6 percent is colored, and 2.6 percent is Indian (CIA 2002). They also give Tanzania
a high ethnic fractionalization value (0.93) even though 95 percent of its population comes from
130 different tribes (2002).
4

See my full paper for the codebook of my additions to Mansfield and Snyder's dataset.

5

This variable, civwar. reports civil wars as listed in the Correlates of War project. However, note
that it does not include states' interventions into other nations' civil wars although COW
includes these data.

" Refer to "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War" pages 319-320 (Mansfield and
Snyder 2002).
, I remove two control variables from this regression. civil war in year t-I and major power status.
because they appear to apply specifically to regressions examining the causes of extern." wars.
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rather than external wars (see Tables la and Ib). Third, I alter the civil war
regression ro include ethnic fractionalization and the five ethnic fractionalization interaction terms as independent variables (see Tables 2a and 2b). Finally,
I run a series of robustness checks on the civil war regression that includes the
ethnic fractionalization variables.
Results and Analysis
Although I employ a slightly less-sophisticated regression than Mansfield
and Snyder, I replicate their model for external wars with remarkably little
deviation.' This is much as I would expect as I use their dataset and defll1itions.
As Mansfield and Snyder contend, these results strongly support their argument
about the dangers of democratization and external war.
In the second regression (Tables la and I b), however, their model performs
less-brilliantly as a predictor of civil war. The results of this regression are
considerably weaker than Mansfield and Snyder's analysis of external war.'
Moreover, complete democratic transition replaces incomplete democratic
transition as the statistically significant regime change variable. Therefore, these
results are a noteworthy departure from Mansfield and Snyder's findings.
Table la
ClaSSification Table for Civil Waf
Predicted
r:ivil w:>,' in lim" I
00

()h~"rv"rl

Step 1

Civil wars in time t

.00
1.00

Overall Percentage

100

8805

0

424

0

Percentage
Corr",,1
100.0
.0
95.4

a. The cut value is .500

~ Incomplete democratic transition, the interaction between incomplete democratic transition and

domestic concentration of authority in central government, major power status, and concentra-

tion of capabilities are statistically significant in Illy work just as they are in Mansfield and Snyder·s.
"The Nagelkerke R sq"are vallie decreases tram 0.125 to 0.045 when civil war replaces external war
as the dependent variable.
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Table lb
Logistic Regression for Civil War
B
2.889

S.E.
.668

Wald
18.698

·.256
.549

.810
1.047

.100
.275

·4.780

16.259

.086

·.123
·.480

.032
.169

15.275
8.D70

INCDTRS
COMPATRS
INCATRS
DOMCON
CDTRSDC
INCDTRDC

.000

EXD(B)
17.968

1
1

.752
.600

774
1.732

1

.769

.008

1
1

.000
.005

.884
.619

Sia.

.159

.149

1.139

1

.286

1.173

-.031
6.926
.090

.162
1.014
3.211

.036
46.637

1
1

.849

001

1

.978

.970
1018.496
1.094

·4.090

.338

146.354

1

.000

017

CATRSDC
CONCAP
INCATRDC
Constant

1

df

.000

Notes: Following I\1ansfield and Snyder, this lllode! is calculated after including a n.HlIfal
spline fUl1nion with three knots. For Bold values p

S;

.0 t.

It is interesting that Mansfield and Snyder focus on the direction of a
regime change rather than its scope to explain why democratizing nations enter
external wars. It would be interesting to investigate why complete democratic
transitions replace incomplete democratic transitions when civil war replaces
external war as the dependent variable. This is an aspect of their argument that
Mansfield and Snyder do not develop, suggesting an area for further research.

Table 2a
Classification Table for Civil War (Including Ethnic Fractionalization Varlableil)
Pr"rlid"rl
r.ivil
Slep 1

()h""rvF!rI
Civil wars in lime I

.00
1.00

Overall Percenlage
a. The cui value is .500
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.00
7795
393

in limF! I

1.00

2
5

Percentage
r.nrrF!d
100.0
1.3
95.2
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Table 2b
Logistic Regression forCivii War (Including Ethnic Fractionalization Variables)
R

COMPDTRS
INCDTRS
COMPATRS
INCATRS
DOMCON
CDTRSDC
INCDTRDC
CATRSDC
INCATRDC
CONCAP
EXCD
EXINCD
EXCA
EXINCA
ETHFRAC
Constant

.783
-.778
-1.565
-4.541

SF

.996
1.001

W~lrl

rl!

Sin

FxnfR\

1
1
1
1

.432
.437
.226
.817

2.188
459

1.292
19.624

.618
604
1.467
.054

-.115
-.258
.127

.033
.191
.161

11.890
1.816
.615

1
1
1

.001
.178
433

.891
.773
1.135

.100
.067
4.553
3.205

.161
3.758
1.076
1.040

384
.000
17.914
9.503

1
1
1
1

.536
.986
.000
.002

1.105
1.070
94.963
24.654

1.481
2.432
-.455

864
.929
22.924

2.942
6.854
000

1
1

.086
.009

1

.984

4400
11.377
.635

.238
-3.491

.214
.348

1.236
100.779

1
1

.266
.000

1.269
.030

.209
.011

Notes: Following i\1allsf.eld and Snyder, this model is calcubte-d after including a natural

spline function with three knots. For Bold values p S .0 I, for italicized values p S .10.

Despite the significant limitations of my ethnic fractionalization variables,lo they still lead to some interesting results when I include them in my
analysis. Table 2b demonstrates that the ethnic composition of a democratizing
nation's population is an important factor in the outbreak of civil war. When
ethnic fractionalization is included in the regression, each of Mansfield and
Snyder's regime change variables becomes insignificant. The interaction
between ethnic fractionalization and complete democratic transition, and, to a
lesser degree, the interaction between ethnic fractionalization and incomplete
democratic transition turn out to be better predictors of civil war than democratizing regime changes alone. Moreover, these results persist when subjected to
several robustness checks. II
Thes<: findings provide substantial support for my contention that the
interaction between ethnic fractionalization and democratization pushes
states toward civil war. Importantly, ethnic fractionalization by itself is not a
significant predictor of civil war. As I expect, these results show that ethnic

", Primarily as a result of the weaknesses of Taylor and Hudson's measure.
" My results are robust (I) when ethnic fractionalization (ethfrtlc) is excluded from the analysis, (2)
when major power stalus and ethnic fractionalization are included, and (3) when ethnic
fractionalization is excluded and major power status is included.
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heterogeneity exacerbates the institutional and political difficulties that democratizing countries face and make it more likely that these nations will experience
internal war.
How Ethnicity Leads a Democratizing State to Civil War
Statistical analyses often paint only a rough sketch of the actual mechanisms that shape political outcomes. Accordingly, I turn my attention to a
theoretical discussion of the causes of intrastate ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflict
literature typically employs arguments from rwo principal perspectives, the
"primordialist" approach and the "mobilizationist" approach, to explain violent
inter-group conflict.
The primordialist perspective views ethnicity as a stable 'given' that does
not depend on time or social context (Mousseau 2001, 548-9). As one scholar
summarized, "Primordialists explain strong ethnic attachments with psychological or biological factors that ... have primary significance in the formation
of a sense of belonging, in-group identity, and solidarity among the members
of an ethnic group" (549). According to this standpoint, 'primordial qualities,'
such as "attachments to kin, territory, and religion," define group members'
identity and self-esteem (McKay 1982, 396). Because man is "a leopard who
cannot change his ethnic spots," ethnic conflict results from inevitable clashes
over intrinsic group differences (398).
The primordialist perspective accounts well for the emotional strength of
centuries-old ethnic attachments. However, its exaggerated focus on the intrinsic,
unalterable qualities of ethnicity renders primordialism weak in explanatory
power. The primordialist perception of static ethnic identities does not reflect the
dynamic influences, such as political or economic context, that shape group
loyalties nor does it explain why or when group loyalties change (McKay 1982,
397-399). Moreover, although primordialist arguments might explain wl.ry ethnically
heterogeneous nations become entangled in civil wars during a period of democratization, they do not clearly explain how ethnicity leads to this internal strife.
On the other hand, mobilizationists offer a more compelling analysis of
ethnically-motivated conflict. According ro this perspective, ethnicity is often
a tool for group mobilization during times of political transition (Cordell
1999, 5) because people with shared descent, cultural characteristics, and
history are likely to "define their interests in ethnocultural terms [, making it]
easier... for leaders to mobilize them for collective action" (Gurr 2000, 66).
Conflict results when leaders mobilize competing groups along ethnic lines in
order to secure access to material, social, and political resources by force
(McKay 1982, 399).
David Lake and Donald Rothchild present a persuasive mobilizationist
argument that cites collective fears and insecurity as the cause of ethnic conflict
(1996). In the context of a weak state, such as during democratization, faction
leaders mobilize the populace along ethnic lines because "ethnic identities are
almost always the most effective organizing principle ... [and as a result,] politics
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usually take the form of a struggle to secure group interests" (Carroll and Carroll 2000, 121). During the unpredictable period of democratization, states are
unable to arbitrate between ethnic rivals or to offer these groups credible assurances of protection. Collective fears that their physical or cultural survival is
threatened cause ethnic groups to cooperate less and compete more rigorously.
Ethnic violence erupts when rival factions face three strategic dilemmas: information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma
(Lake and Rothchild 1996, 43-4).
Case Selection
If Lake and Rothchild's argument is correct, we should see competing ethnicities in democratizing states struggle with information failures, problems of
credible commitment, and the security dilemma. Collective fears for group
survival should induce ethnic rivals to cooperate less and ultimately engage in
violent conflict. Russia's difficulties in Chechnya present a vivid application of
Lake and Rothchild's argument. This case clearly depicts the internal struggles
common to ethnically diverse countries as they move toward democratic government. On the other hand, Japan under the 'Taisho Democracy' is a good
example of an ethnically homogenous state that engaged in external warfare
during its period of democratization. Here, Manstleld and Snyder's theoretical
argument provides the best explanation of why Japan's early liberalization concluded in a violent incursion into Manchuria. An examination of these two cases
casts greater light on the different facets of my theoretical argument and carefully
details how democratization and ethnic heterogeneity can lead to civil war.
Japan: Democratization and External War
Most political historians agree that the period following World War I and
preceding the 1930s was a remarkable time in Japanese history. It was a time of
considerable economic reform and institutional liberalization. The Taisho
Democracy marked Japan's early experience with democratic values and mass
politics. However, Japan's progress toward mature democracy was interrupted
by the multiple shocks of the depression and growing military activism. By the
mid-1930s, Japan's fledgling democracy had entirely collapsed, and the imperialistic, military rule that would haunt the Pacific during World War II solidified
its power. These brief years of Japanese democratization clearly illustrate how an
ethnically homogenous nation's experiment with democracy ended in external
warfare. .
The roots of Japanese liberalism reach back to Japan's nineteenth-century
revolution. As a central feature of that revolution, the Meiji oligarchs created a
constitutional order in 1890 and promoted the industrialization and capitalization of Japan's economy (Gordon 1991, 14-5). Their emperor-centered constitutional order, which lasted from 1890 to 1945, set the stage for new
institutions and new types of political activity. The industrial growth Japan
experienced during WW I also initiated important changes in Japan's political
and social composition. Japan's industrial expansion "led to a concentration of
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the population in urban areas, creating not only a large number of factory
workers, but also [a] new middle class: civil servants, white collar workers, [and]
professional people" (Silberman and Harootunian 1974,219). This population
concentration contributed to the creation of an urban mass society. In addition,
relatively high levels of education and a quickly developing system of communication media heralded the dawn of an era of mass politics (229).
Most of the leaders and participants in the democratic movement that
flowered around the turn of the century were "men of means and education ..
. landlords, capitalists, and an emerging class of urban professionah, in particular journalists and lawyers" (Gordon 1991, 16). In contrast to the former
ruling structure of a narrow class of bureaucrats and military officers, the
imperial democracy eventually incorporated a much broader elite, granting the
middle class expanded influence under the new system (126). The formation of
the Seiyukai party in 1918 marked an important transition in the democratic
movement. This event signaled the end of imperial democracy as a movement
and the beginning of the Taisho Democracy as a strucrure of rule (14).
Although "universal manhood suffrage was adopted in 1925" (Gordon
1991,2), in reality relatively few Japanese citizens could participate in the political process. During Japan's period of democratization, methods for effective
political participation were remarkably weak. Political party membership was
extremely limited and the parties themselves enjoyed only circumscribed
authority (Silberman and Harootunian 1974, 229). The urban masses were
excluded from political participation altogether, and with no peaceful alternative, the poor often resorted to revolt and rioting as a way to influence policy
makers. Such was the case in the 1918 "Rice Riots," when the masses responded
violently to an increase in the price of rice (230).
The democratic reforms of early twentieth-century Japan were certainly
felt across the Japanese political spectrum, but one organization was left largely
untouched by the pressures of democratization: Japan's military. The armed
forces had a great deal of independence from the new democratic structures and
could appeal directly to the emperor without so much as consulting the rest of
the administration (Silberman and Harootunian 1974, 225). Early military
ventures onto the Asian mainland drew criticism from democratic liberals,
despite pressure from military elites (22 I). Japan's armed intervention in Siberia
from 1919 to 1922 and its incursion into the Shantung Peninsula from 1927
to 1928 foreshadowed the virulent militarism that would emerge only a few
years later.
During the 1930s, military officers and elements of the extreme right
sought to topple the imperial democracy through repeated coups d'etat.
Although each coup attempt failed, the military did succeed in intimidating the
established institutions. The largest of the coup attempts "occurred on February 25, 1936, when young extremist officers, commanding some 1,400 soldiers,
assassinated several cabinet ministers, occupied the governmental quarter of
16
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Tokyo, and demanded a military government presided over by the emperor"
(Silberman and Harootunian 1974, 233). The military's repeated coup
attempts sufficiently frightened civil and bureaucratic leaders into adjusting
government policy to more fully accommodate the military's demands. As a
result, policy making generally shifted in the direction the military desired:
toward a military garrison state (233). With greater political influence, the
military found it no hard task to subsequently mobilize public sentiment in
favor of its fifteen-year campaign into Manchuria. The Japanese public was
"easily manipulated" by being offered the exciting illusion of participating in a
great imperial power (231). The external conflicts that followed, especially WW
II, destroyed Japan's emerging democratic institutions and the painstaking work
of previous decades.
Japan's rocky experience with democratization provides an excellent
example of how conflict is likely to result during the difficult period of regime
change. The Japanese experience parallels my expectation for a democratizing
state with an ethnically homogenous population in several ways. First, the
constitutional order imposed by the Meiji oligarchs widened the political
spectrum and new groups emerged as political players. Second, emerging
democratic institutions, especially political parties, could not accommodate
all demands for political participation. Urban masses were largely excluded
from the political process. Third, the ruling class that the new democratic
system supplanted had strong ties to the military. Indeed, the old elites were
Japanese generals and admirals, all former samurai warriors (Gordon 1991,
126). Fourth, appeals to the masses were centered on imperialistic ideals and
Japanese nationalism. Elites exploited popular support for honoring the
nation and the emperor and for pursuing hegemony in Asia (52). External
war was the specific result of compromises between the primary rival factions
in the Japanese government: the emerging democratic bureaucracy and the
military elite. The democratic bureaucracy sought to accommodate military
demands and avert future coups d'etat by moving policy decisions in a direction that the military favored. These conciliatory actions merely facilitated
the military's imperialistic ventures abroad and eventually thrust Japan into
external war in Manchuria.
_Chechnya: Russia's Democratization and Internal War
The bloody conflict in Chechnya vividly illustrates the internal violence
that often accompanies an ethnically diverse state's transition to democracy.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's physical and political composition has changed dramatically. Today Russia encompasses only a fraction
of the territory once united under the USSR. Ethnic nationalists in Chechnya
would reduce this territory still further. These disaffected Chechens seek selfdetermination and the freedom to create an independent Chechen state. The
Russian government vigorously opposes such secessionist demands and has
matched every Chechen action with a brutal military response of its own.
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Ethnically; the Chechens are a non-Slavic people that have lived in Chechnya
for thousands of years. They have a unique language that is distinct from the
surrounding Slavic and Turkish dialects. Chechen social strucrure is distincrly
clan-oriented and this kinship-based society is reinforced by a "very deep sense
of economic community, and an instinctive will to fight 'infidels' inspired by
Islamic culture" (Arquilla and Karasik 1999, 209-10). In sum, Chechen
culture, traditions, and religions share little with Russian society (Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1995,9).
According to 1989 USSR Census data, Chechnya had quite a diverse
ethnic population under Soviet rule. About 58 percent of the populace was
Chechen, 23 percent was Russian, and 19 percent represented other minorities
(Aklaev 1999, 228, 126). The collapse of communism unleashed ethnic nationalism in the Caucasus region, and on October 27, 1990, Chechnya unilaterally
declared its independence. Two years later, Chechnya refused to be a cosigner
when the Russian Federation was formed on March 31, 1992 (Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe 1995, 10). Since that time, Russia has
treated Chechnya as an autonomous republic, albeit a rebellious one, not an
independent nation and therefore refuses to extend independent status. The
Russian perception that most angers Chechens is that Russia constitutes "first
and foremost ethnic Russians, and ... the territory of ethnic autonomies inside
the Russian Federation [can] be claimed as Russian, but their inhabitants [are
not] considered Russian citizens" (Tishkov 1997,428).
The first Chechen war erupted in 1994 and dragged on for two violent
years. By some estimates, more than three hundred thousand individuals,
mostly civilians, lost their lives in the conflict (Banerjee 1999, AlO). In August
1996, Chechen forces launched a surprise offensive on the Russian troops holding Crozny, the capital city. Russian tanks and heavy artillery, ill-suited for an
urban battlefield, were soon overwhelmed by small bands of Chechen guerillas.
The war came to a halt when President Yeltsin sent Alexander Lebed to negotiate a cease-fire agreement with the Chechens in October 1996 (Arquilla and
Karasik 1999,211-3).
The Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations, signed May 12, 1997,
held great symbolic meaning for Chechnya. Apart from the treaty's grandiose
claims to peace and an end to ancient rivalries, Chechens saw the cease-fire
agreement as an implicit recognition of Chechnya's independent statehood
(Tishkov 1997, 431). For Russia, however, the treaty merely reaffirmed the
Federation's "respect for its negotiating partners, confirming their rights, status,
and privileges within the limits of a larger state structure" (431). The text of the
treaty, only four short sentences, could be interpreted to conform to the agenda
and prejudices of either side.
A central aspect of the cease-fire agreement was that both parties agreed to
"forever repudiate the use and the threat to use military force to resolve whatever disputes may arise" (Tishkov 1997, 432). This provision was quickly
18
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forgotten, however, when violence again broke out in October of 1999. On
October 4, the Wall Street Journal reported that Russian troops had crossed into
Chechnya, expanding airs trikes on CroZllY to the threat of a full-scale land
assault. This decisive military action came as a response to Chechen incursions
into Dagestan and accusations that Chechen rebels were responsible for a string
of terrorist bombings killing more than three hundred people in Moscow and
other Russian cities (Whalen 1999, A30).
Russia's protracted civil war produced as many as three hundred thousand
refugees and obliterated the Chechen capital of CroZllY, once home to four
hundred thousand people (Wines 2000, sec.4 p.l; Anonymous 2000, A26).
This bloody conflict illustrates the dangers of ethnic violence during a state's
transition to democratic rule in several important ways. Primarily, it is evident
that both the Russians and the Chechens were motivated by collective fears
about the future. Chechnya wanted to safeguard its ethnic identity and secure its
nation's interests through self-determination and political independence. Russia,
on the other hand, was concerned about losing influence and access to resources.
Specifically, the Russians feared that granting Chechen independence would initiate a destabilizing cascade of secessionist demands throughout the Russian Federation (Arquilla and Karasik 1999, 209). The effects of these collective fears
have been compounded by three strategic dilemmas. First, both sides have had
significant incentives to misrepresent information about their capabilities and
their intentions. Indeed, both parties have engaged extensively in information
warfare. For example, during the 1994-1996 conflict, Chechen rebels used
radio-jamming systems ro interrupt Russian mass media broadcasts and sent fake
radio transmissions intended to be intercepted by Russian intelligence officers
(Arquilla and Karasik 1999, 217). Second, the Russians and Chechens failed to
credibly commit to a cooperative solution to the conflict. In October 1999, the
warring factions demonstrated they were all too willing to ignore the 1997 ceasefire agreement and their sweeping commitments to peace. Finally, information
failures and problems with credible commitment pushed the competing factions
into the security dilemma (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 52). Incentives for
cooperation were not sufficient to overcome collective fears, and as a result, each
side was motivated to cheat on cooperative agreements and use preemptive force.
For example, Russia's brutal 'liberation' of Crozny in February 2000 was a preemptive m~ve against future demands for Chechen independence.
This violent internal struggle has exacted a high price in human suffering.
Competing ethnic identities and the problems of credible commitment and
information failure fueled this protracted struggle. Clearly democratization is
not an entirely rosy proposition. Indeed, Russia's transition to democratic rule
has been anything but smooth.
Conclusion
Clearly, this research would benefit from further investigation of quantitative measures and cases within this problem area. In particular, it would be very
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interesting to see how a more precise measure of states' ethnic composition
would influence the present research. I anticipate that a more valid measure of
ethnic heterogeneity would strengthen my statistical results, further justifYing
my research expectations. It is telling of the importance of the relationship
between ethnic fractionalization, democratization, and civil war, however, that
despite the weaknesses of this project, my analysis still generates statistically
significant results.
Even at this point, the implications of this discussion are plain, and I echo
the caution initially offered by Mansfield and Snyder. Although increasing the
number of democratic nations across the world may indeed be in our longterm interests, national leaders must be aware that the transition to democracy
is laced with significant hazards. Policy makers should couple their pro-democracy agenda with consistent "efforts to mold strong, centralized institutions
that can withstand the intense demands ... [of] high-energy mass politics....
If mass politics arrives before the institutions that are needed to regulate it,
hollow or failed democracy is likely to result" (Mansfield and Snyder 2002,
334). Popular crusades for democratization, therefore, should be tempered
with caution and with an understanding that this type of political change has
the potential to provoke interstate aggressions as well as to push nations into
civil war.
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